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Following a policy rule mechanically when operating monetary policy is nei-
ther realistic nor practical. Nevertheless, monetary policy rules have received
a great deal of attention in recent macroeconomic research. The paper focuses
on a famous interest rate rule, namely the Taylor Rule, to show that the rule
parameters are robust to most of the output gap measures and the speciﬁca-
tions considered, i.e. the inﬂation coeﬃcient is above unity and the output gap
coeﬃcient is positive. The estimated rule is shown to track the actual policy
performance during the EMU period remarkably well. In addition, the esti-
mated rule is used as an indicator of macroeconomic convergence in the union
and it is demonstrated that the optimal EMU rate has not been in accordance
with domestic conditions in certain countries.
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11 Introduction
Following a policy rule mechanically when operating monetary policy is neither real-
istic nor practical; it would be deceptive and simplistic to believe that a simple policy
rule can be implemented in the daily conduct of policy by the central bank. A ﬁrst
reason is that such a rule would be incapable of processing all the information that
is indicative of macroeconomic developments and may help to interpret the current
economic situation. Furthermore, given that diﬀerent sources of shocks call for dif-
ferent policy responses, a simple rule is too restrictive to be used as the sole reliable
indicator. Moreover, there are practical diﬃculties in the actual implementation of
such rules, since some of the variables entering the rule are not directly observable,
and are likely to be prone to real time mismeasurement.
Nevertheless, monetary policy rules have received a great deal of attention in
recent macroeconomic research. Quoting from the European Central Bank (from
now on abbreviated as ECB) Monthly Bulletin (October 2001, p.38): "The emphasis
on rule-guided monetary policy... is general l yw e l c o m e[ b e c a u s e ]i tp r o v i d e sas a l u t a r y
antidote to the perennial risks of a discretionary, ad-hoc approach to policy-making."
Speaking of the virtues ascribed to the simple rules, it should be emphasised that
they are easily veriﬁed ex-post by the private sector, and they simplify the commu-
nication of policy orientations to the general public. And as the ECB acknowledges,
"... an understanding of the central’s banks actions is important for its credibility
and, therefore, its eﬀectiveness in achieving its objectives"(Monthly Bulletin October
2001, p.38). This last feature of the simple monetary policy rules oﬀered me the
motivation to explore the properties of the Taylor rule.
Thus, this paper focuses on a simple feedback rule for the Euro-Area. Based on
the relevant academic literature and the ECB publications, I specify the theoretical
relationship between the short-run interest rate and the macroeconomic conditions,
and then, by using Euro-Area aggregate data, I estimate its parameters. My main
interest is the robustness properties of the rule and, for this purpose, I estimate it
for various output gap measures and for two price indices. Additionally, making use
of the estimated rule, I investigate the convergence in the macroeconomic conditions
in the Euro-Area by checking the optimality of the implied EMU target rate for the
member countries. To be more speciﬁc, in section 2, I brieﬂy review the literature on
interest rate rules, and in section 3, I give information on the method and the data
used for the estimation. More interestingly, in section 4, I present the results of the
robustness analysis, and, in section 5, I select one speciﬁcation and check whether it
ﬁts the data. In section 6, I examine the optimality of the rule-indicated EMU target
for the member countries with the intention to comment on convergence. Finally,
section 8 oﬀers concluding remarks.
22 The benchmark monetary policy rule
The behavior of an independent central bank is typically captured by a pair of equa-
tions. The ﬁrst is the economic structural equation, which describes how a set of
endogenous variables (including, for example, inﬂation and output) is related to a
set of variables outside the control of the central bank, to current and past values
of the interest rate set by the central bank and to a random shock. The second
equation is the reaction function, which describes how the central bank responds to
the macroeconomic conditions of the country. In the EMU framework, the national
banks’ reaction functions have been replaced by a single reaction function, which
responds to the EMU state of economy. As recognized by the ECB, "...the central
bank’s operational framework, by and large, makes it more natural to think of the in-
terest rate as the policy instrument rather than the monetary base" (Monthly Bulletin,
October 2001, p.38).
In this section, I describe the developments concerning the monetary policy rule
that I make use of in the following sections. This particular benchmark is the so-
called Taylor rule; a simple rule that gives the optimal interest rate as a function of
the conditions of the economy, and that "has become rather popular both in academic
literature and among professional central bank watchers in recent years", according
to the ECB Monthly Bulletin (October 2001, p.40).
To be more speciﬁc, Taylor (1993) proposed a simple monetary rule which was
found to track actual monetary policy in the United States surprisingly well in his









where θ1,θ 2 are parameters, it,π t, and yt denote the federal funds rate, inﬂation and
output respectively, ∗ denotes target values and rt is the equilibrium long-run real
rate. In words, monetary authorities adjust the short-term interest rate in response to
inﬂation deviations from its target level, and to the size of the output gap. Equation
(1) can be rewritten as:
i
∗
t = it − βπ
∗












t = α + βπt + γxt, (3)
where xt = yt − y∗
t is the output gap, it = rt + π∗
t is the equilibrium nominal rate,
β = θ1 +1 ,γ = θ2 and the constant term is deﬁned as α ≡ it − βπ∗
t.1 According to
1Although π∗
t and it cannot be identiﬁed separately, using the estimates of α and β it is possible
to recover an estimate of the central bank’s target inﬂation rate, π∗
t, for a given value of it.S e e
section 5.
3Taylor, θ1 = θ2 =0 .5,π ∗
t =2 , rt =2 , and he speciﬁe dt h er u l ea sf o l l o w s :
i
∗
t = πt +0 .5(πt − 2) + 0.5xt +2 , (4)
i
∗
t =1 + 1 .5πt +0 .5xt. (5)
While it is commonly acknowledged that, given the uncertainty of macroeconomic
developments, neither the United States Federal Reserve nor the European Central
Bank could consider giving up discretionary authority over monetary policy, the Tay-
lor rule has received a great deal of attention due to its good tracking of policy moves.
However, there are numerous uncertain issues concerning the speciﬁcation of the rule.
In what follows I refer to a number of surveys that have used some type of Taylor
rule.
A ﬁrst issue is whether the interest rate target should respond solely to actual
and observed values, as it does in the Taylor (1993) rule, or to a measure of expected
future inﬂation (the so-called forward-looking response). Clarida & Gertler (1996)
used a forward-looking version of the simple Taylor (1993) rule to argue that monetary
policy in the German economy, contrary to the conventional view according to which
the Bundesbank was targeting a money aggregate, is well described by a Taylor rule
rather than well modeled as a monetary targeting experience. Clarida et al. (1998)
have investigated monetary policy-making in Europe by estimating various reaction
functions, where the central bank adjusts the nominal short-term interest rate to
respond to the gaps of expected inﬂation and output from their respective targets.
Again they applied a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule, and oﬀered evidence
to support that their baseline forward-looking speciﬁcation works quite well against
various alternatives, including the backward-looking one.
In a more recent work, Clarida et al. (2000) have again estimated a forward-
looking monetary policy reaction function for postwar United States. They have
pointed out that their speciﬁcation nests the Taylor rule as a special case, and they
observed that, when estimating the coeﬃcients of the rule, results may be mislead-
ing in the case where neither lagged inﬂation nor any linear combination of lagged
inﬂation and output gap are suﬃcient statistics for forecasting inﬂation. The reason
for this is that, in addition to the size of the policy response, estimated coeﬃcients
capture the ability of each variable to forecast the state of the economy. Nonethe-
less, they have found that during the 1987- 1992 period analyzed by Taylor, their
target rate tracks the actual rate about as well as the simple Taylor (1993) rule does.
Moreover, they have observed that their main conclusions can be obtained from a
backward-looking speciﬁcation as well.
In the same context, Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998a) have also worked on
the monetary mechanism in Europe. They have estimated monetary policy reaction
functions, assuming that the central bank adjusts the nominal short-term interest rate
to respond to the state of the economy, which, according to these authors, is described
by the deviations of expected inﬂation, output and nominal exchange rate from their
target levels. Thus, they extend the closed-economy speciﬁcation adopted by the
4previously mentioned authors to an open economy, and they comment that their
results could have been produced from estimating either a forward-looking model
or a genuine Taylor rule; the reason for this being that they focus on equilibrium
parameters, and in equilibrium expectational errors are not relevant.
Regarding the question of whether an interest rate response to the forecast of
inﬂation would work better than an interest rate response to the actual inﬂation rate,
Taylor (1999) has argued that forward-looking rules are based on current and lagged
data, since forecasts are based on them. As a result, in his opinion, inﬂation forecast
rules are not more forward-looking than rules that explicitly react to current and/or
lagged variables.
To continue, a second uncertain issue concerning the interest rate setting is whether
the short-term interest rate should respond to other variables that describe the state
of the economy, in addition to inﬂation and to the output gap. Goodfriend (1991)
has argued that the central bank cares about smoothing changes in the interest rate,
for fear of disrupting capital markets, or of losing credibility from sudden and large
policy reversals, or in order to support policy changes, while Rudebusch (1995) has
provided evidence on serial correlation of interest rate changes. In this perspective,
Clarida et al. (1998), Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998a) have included an ad-
justment mechanism in the reaction functions they have estimated. Thus, assuming
that the central bank is concerned about smoothing changes in the interest rate, the
actual rate adjusts accordingly:
it =( 1 − ρ)i
∗
t + ρit−1 + υt, (6)
it =( 1 − ρ)α +( 1− ρ)βπt +( 1− ρ)γxt + ρit−1 + υt, (7)
where ρ ∈ [0,1] captures the degree of interest rate smoothing, and υt is an i.i.d.
disturbance representing exogenous shocks to the short rate, arising, for instance, in
the market for reserves or in the exchange rate risk. Equation (7) combines the target
equation (3) with the adjustment mechanism (6).
Speaking of additional variables that may inﬂuence rate setting, Dornbusch, Favero
& Giavazzi (1998a) have considered deviations of the nominal exchange rate, while
Clarida et al. (1998) have considered a number of alternatives including monetary
aggregates and foreign countries’ short-term interest rates. To include such a variable,
say zt, the target rate relation can be modiﬁed accordingly (Clarida et al. (1998)):
i
∗
t = α + βπt + γxt + η(zt − z
∗). (8)
A third uncertain issue is the size of the parameters; that is whether the interest
rate should respond to actual inﬂation or real output by a larger or smaller amount
than the benchmark rule. The central bank is assumed to choose the short-term
interest rate in an environment with nominal rigidities where monetary policy aﬀects
real activity in the short-run; by varying the nominal rate, the central bank eﬀectively
varies the real rate. Clarida et al. (1998) have emphasized the importance of the
5inﬂation rate coeﬃcient size, since it determines the stabilizing properties of the
rule. If β<1, the target rate adjusts to accommodate changes in inﬂation; this is
because, even though the central bank raises the nominal rate in response to the rise
in inﬂation, the increase is not suﬃcient to keep the real rate from declining. In the
opposite case, where β>1, the target rate adjusts to stabilize inﬂation, and if in
addition γ>0, output stabilizes as well.
In the same spirit, Smets (1998) has emphasized the crucial role of the output
gap in the attempt to stabilize inﬂation. He notes that even if the central bank cares
solely about inﬂation stabilization, it has to respond signiﬁcantly to the output gap.
Gerlach & Smets (1999) assert the central role of the output gap in the monetary
transmission mechanism, particularly in a relatively closed economy such as the EMU
area. They justify its importance to the practical conduct of monetary policy (even
if the primary objective is to maintain price stability) by arguing that short-term
interest rates inﬂuence aggregate demand and the output gap, which in turn aﬀect
inﬂation through a Phillips-curve relationship.
Indeed, it shall be pointed out that there is still great uncertainty about measur-
ing potential GDP. Orphanides (2000) has argued that output gap mismeasurement
problems, due to lack of information in real time, impose signiﬁcant impediments to a
successful stabilization policy. He argues that the work of the authors mentioned ear-
lier in this section (and of many others)2 on how reaction functions related to equation
(3) describe the central bank’s behavior is based on absence of informational prob-
lems. He considers this as an ‘unrealistic informational assumption’, and he believes
that in order to construct a realistic and trustworthy policy alternative, the noise in
the measurement of inﬂation and output gap should be taken into account. Smets
(1998), focusing on the measurement error in the output gap, has proved that such
error can partially explain why central banks respond relatively more to inﬂation than
to the output gap, compared with a situation in which the output gap is known.
Despite the reduced eﬃciency caused by the poor estimation of the variables, the
rule remains inherently stable. In this context, Taylor (1999) has simulated diﬀerent
interest rate rules in a seven-country large open economy model, and has found that
simple policy rules, with the inﬂation coeﬃcient above the unity critical threshold, are
eﬃcient and robust, even more robust than complex ones across a variety of models.
Moreover, he argues that the basic results about simple policy rules designed for the
United States seem to apply broadly to many countries. Thus, he suggests that the
simple benchmark rule proposed in 1993 shall be used as a guideline for the ECB.
2To mention some, Ball (1997), Rotemberg & Woodford (1998) and Svensson (1997).
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3.1 The unique nature of the exercise
Bearing in mind the numerous surveys supporting the good performance of the Taylor
rule, in this section I use Euro-Area aggregate data to estimate such a rule for the
EMU and check its robustness to various output gap measurement methods, and to
price indices.
The Maastricht Treaty, which governs the ECB, assigns to the bank the mandate
or the ’primary objective’ to maintain price stability. Therefore, one can expect
the inﬂation coeﬃcient to be above the threshold of unity so as to ensure inﬂation
stabilization. In addition, the ECB is encouraged, ‘without prejudice to its primary
objective’, to support the general economic policies in the Community, which include
a long list of desirables (e.g., a high level of employment). As a result, it is expected
that the output gap coeﬃcient will be positive, although not particularly high.3
With respect to the inclusion of the exchange rate, the Treaty states that ‘the
Council of Ministers may formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy’
and adds that these orientations ‘shall be without prejudice to the primary objective
of the ECB’. However, devaluation could be expected to disturb ECB’s principal
target of price stability and therefore it may be a factor that determines rate setting.
Thus, although nominal exchange rate deviation has no reason to appear among the
regressors, its inclusion in the instrument list is plausible. As for the role of various
monetary aggregates, the ECB has explained that it reaches its primary objective by
means of a “two-pillar” strategy: the ﬁrst pillar consists of a reference value for the
growth of the broad money supply (M3) and the second of a collection of forecasts
and indicators of inﬂation. Thus, the growth of M3 is a candidate variable to be
included in the interest rate relation.
My attempt to estimate an interest rate feedback rule for the Euro-Area is, how-
ever, subject to pitfalls. In the ﬁrst place, the ECB is a newly founded institution
that began full operations in January 1999. Moreover, the Euro Area is itself a newly
formed entity; thus, the Euro-Area published data is synthetic and calculated on
the basis of weighted national data. However, it seems more appropriate to conduct
the analysis using aggregate (rather than disaggregated) data because the ECB is
expected to focus on EMU-wide developments; by doing so it avoids pressure to pay
attention to country-speciﬁc conditions. An often-heard criticism of the empirical
research on the EMU is that all conclusions and implications are based on historical
pre-EMU data, and that a regime shift of the magnitude of a new monetary union
can possibly invalidate any results obtained from past data. Much as I understand
3One may argue that unless there is an explicit output smoothing objective, the information
embodied in the current output gap is implicitly taken into account by the inﬂation forecast term.
However, in a model estimated for an aggregate of ﬁve EU countries, Peersman& Smets (1998) have
s h o w nt h a te v e ni ft h ec e n t r a lb a n kf o c u s e ss o l e l yo ni n ﬂation and attaches zero importance on
output, the Taylor rule will include a strong response to the output gap.
7that structures in member countries have changed signiﬁcantly, it seems that the ad-
justments have not been so abrupt as to make historical data irrelevant.4 Besides, as
Gerlach &Smets(1999) posit, the EMU policy environment is not a completely new
environment, as it was preceded by a gradual process of monetary convergence.
Similar exercises in the literature Clausen & Hayo (2002) estimate an inter-
est rate rule with current inﬂation rate. They use aggregate data constructed by
weighting national data from Germany, France and Italy for the period 1979:1-1996:4
(the weights correspond to the shares of national GDP in the aggregate). Another
comparable exercise has been presented by Mihov (2001). He estimates a forward-
looking interest rate rule with pooled data from Germany, France and Italy for the
period 1990:3-1998:4, and uses the coeﬃcients of this regression as a proxy for the
Euro-Area reaction function. Gerlach & Schnabel (2000) regress the actual EMU-11
interest rate on the EMU output gap and the current inﬂation rate, accounting for
exchange rate volatility in the EMS. They repeat the exercise for a forward-looking
speciﬁcation. Their sample period is 1990:1-1998:4 and the data is constructed by
aggregating weighted data from the 11 European countries (using OECD weights).
None of the above surveys has considered the robustness of the rule to the out-
put gap, an unobservable variable that is subject to great uncertainty and can be
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the method employed for its estimation. Moreover, none
o ft h ea b o v em a k e su s eo ft h eo ﬃcially published Euro-Area data; instead they use
self-constructed aggregate measures. Some of them work with only 3 out of the 11
member countries. Furthermore, their sample period stops before the start of the
EMU.
Special reference will be made to the work of Gerdesmeier & Roﬃa (2003).5 They
evaluate whether alternative speciﬁcations of the original Taylor rule, based on the
inclusion of additional variables or the use of diﬀerent measures of the output gap and
the inﬂation term, can better track the interest rate setting in the Euro-Area. Their
data, which cover the years 1985 to 2002, are aggregated, and weighted national data
of the EMU member countries for the period before January 1995 (or 1999 for some
series), and thereafter oﬃcial Euro-Area statistics are used.
3.2 Alternative output gap measures
T h eo u t p u tg a pi st h ed i ﬀerence between the actual and the potential output of the
economy: it measures the deviation of output from its equilibrium level, and as such
oﬀers information on the state of the economy. Nevertheless, neither the potential
output nor the output gap can be observed directly, but instead they need to be
estimated. The methods mentioned in the literature can be classiﬁed into three broad
4Mihov (2001) provides statistical evidence against the presence of a structural break in January
1999.
5Their work came out after the submission of the ﬁrst version of the paper in December 2002.
8categories: statistical methods, structural approaches and the production function
method (Dimitz (2001)).
Following the literature, I construct for the Euro-Area a number of output gap
measures that have been suggested for other economies. To be more speciﬁc, Clarida
et al. (2000) use the deviation of log GDP from a ﬁtted quadratic function of time,
and alternatively the deviation of the unemployment rate from a similar time trend-
with the sign of the series alternated. Clarida et al.(1998) detrend the log of industrial
production using a quadratic trend. Similarly, Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998a)
consider a quadratic trend of industrial production as a proxy for the target output.
In addition to these methods, I also construct an output gap series based on the
univariate Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (from now on abbreviated as HP).6 Due to the
non-availability of GDP data at a monthly frequency, I (like the above mentioned
authors) construct my output gap measures using data on industrial production and
unemployment.
The series named G_QUADR is the deviation (multiplied by 100) of the natural
logarithm of the industrial production from a quadratic function of time. The series
named G_UNEMPL is the deviation of the unemployment rate from a quadratic
function of time with the sign switched around. Similarly, the series named G_HP14
and G_HP129 are the deviation (multiplied by 100) of the natural logarithm of the
industrial production from its HP ﬁlter with the smoothing parameter λ equal to
14400 and 129600 respectively. The ﬁfth output gap measure, G_OECD, is the
one published by the OECD based on the production function approach.7 Thus, I
consider all the methods suggested by the literature on interest rate rules, plus the
6Concerning the HP ﬁlter, potential output is determined as the output level that simultaneously
minimizes a weighted average of the gap between actual and potential output and the rate of change
of the output trend. The only requirement for its calculation is output data, which makes the
method simple. However, it has some disadvantages. One of these is the need to ﬁxt h es o - c a l l e d
smoothing parameter. Another one is the so-called end-of-sample problem that arises because at
the end and at the beginning of the sample period the penalty for letting potential output follow the
trend of the data will be small, since the ﬁlter does not take the subsequent reversion of the trend
into account and it simply extends the latest trend to the future. Thus, the otherwise symmetric
HP ﬁlter becomes asymmetric towards the end of the series with a disproportionate emphasis placed
on the last few observations. A way of dealing with this problem is to add projections of the series.
The smoothing parameter λ determines the smoothness of the trend estimates. A low value
produces a ﬁlter that follows actual growth closely and is therefore very volatile, while a higher
value produces smoother trend estimates that follow actual output less closely. In more detail, for
monthly data, a ﬁlter with λ = 14400 ﬁlters cycles lasting more than 20 years, or, in other words,
it incorporates them into the trend, while cycles of 15-16 years are considered cyclical. In a ﬁlter
with λ = 129600, cycles that last about 20 years are considered cyclical. The choice of λ values is
based on Canova (1997), McMorrow& Roeger (2001) and Uhlig& Ravn (2001). For quarterly data,
Hodrick & Prescott (1997) suggest λ = 1600.
7Here the potential output is calculated using a production function relationship and estimates
of the factor inputs available in the economy; for more information, see Giorno et al. (1995). The
output gap equals the diﬀerence of actual GDP from potential GDP as a percentage of potential
GDP (OECD Economic Outlook).
9HP ﬁlter, which is said to produce similar results with a number of other statistical
and semi-structural methods, plus a production function method.
Nevertheless, the ECB ought to focus on overall GDP and not just on industrial
production that is more volatile than GDP. Thus, it may be instructive to com-
pare the results with estimations produced with output gap measures built on GDP
data. For this purpose, I have created two gap measures based on quarterly GDP
data, i.e. the deviation of log GDP from a ﬁtted quadratic function of time (named
G_QUADR_Q) and from a HP ﬁlter with λ=1600 (named G_HP14_Q). These
measures are then converted to monthly frequency using an interpolation method
that assigns each value in the low frequency series to the last high frequency obser-
vation associated with the low frequency period, and places all intermediate points
on straight lines connecting these points.
The output gap series are plotted in ﬁgure 1.8 The spectral analysis has not given
rise to concerns, although there are diﬀerences in the autocorrelations and partial
autocorrelations; the picture is similar for the measures based on the industrial pro-
duction data ( G_QUADR, G_HP14 and G_HP129), but diﬀers for G_UNEMPL
and for G_OECD.
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8Gerdesmeier & Roﬃa (2003) derive the potential output by ﬁtting a trend (both in linear and
quadratic terms) to the data (both industrial production and real GDP) and by employing the HP
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To explore further the robustness of the rule, I also consider an alternative measure
of inﬂation, namely what the literature calls ‘core inﬂation’. This measure excludes
the relatively more volatile components of the Index of Consumer Prices.
3.3 Data and method used for estimation
3.3.1 Estimation method
A na t t e m p tt oe s t i m a t ea ni n t e r e s tr a t er u l eo ft h ef o r mit = c1 + c2πt+n + c3xt + εt
(for n ≥ 0) resulted in an adjusted R2 below 20% and in autocorrelation problems.
To achieve a better speciﬁcation, I considered including variables describing exchange
rate and money supply. This resulted in a signiﬁcant rise in the adjusted R2,b u tt h e
residuals were still autocorrelated. Accounting for interest rate smoothing produces
estimations with high adjusted R2 and uncorrelated residuals. Therefore, the starting
equation of my analysis is
it = c1 + c2πt+n + c3xt + ρit−1 + εt,f o rn ≥ 0. (9)
P u t t i n ga s i d et h ei s s u eo fw h e t h e rt h er u l eo u g h tt oi n c l u d ec u r r e n to rf u t u r e
inﬂation, and of whether other factors aﬀe c tr a t es e t t i n g ,i ti st r u et h a tt h eo u t p u t
gap, a right-hand side variable, is measured with error and, to make matters worse,
the interest rate is an important determinant of both inﬂation and output. All these
may possibly imply cov(πt,ε t) 6=0and/or cov(xt,ε t) 6=0 . This violation is known
to result in biased and inconsistent Ordinary Least Squares estimators. In such a
case, the standard approach is to implement an instrumental variables regression.
The method applied here is the Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS from now on), a
special case of the instrumental variables regression. All estimations are performed
with EViews.
The instrument set includes lagged values (in most cases from the ﬁrst to the sixth,
the ninth and the twelfth lag and in no case more than 24 lags) of the output gap,
11the inﬂation rate, the interest rate, the United States core inﬂation rate, the monthly
diﬀerence of the (logarithm) euro real eﬀective exchange rate and the (percentage)
deviation of (the natural logarithm of) the money supply from its HP trend (with
λ =14400).9
In the forward-looking speciﬁcations, I use actual values, and not expected or
forecasted ones. Apart from lacking reliable data, it is controversial to choose among
forecasts, in the absence of oﬃcial and commonly accepted forecasts. Besides, this is
a common practice in the literature where oﬃcial projections do not exist. However,
it should be clear that in this way I assume perfect foresight.
Like most of the authors involved in the literature, I base my analysis on the
fundamental assumption that within short samples short-term interest rates and in-
ﬂation are stationary. Nevertheless, I have applied a number of unit root tests, to
ﬁnd that for the full sample, non-stationarity cannot be rejected for the inﬂation and
the interest rate series, while for the post-1999 period there is strong evidence of
stationarity.
3.3.2 The data
My data are monthly time series for the Euro-Area and are obtained from the OECD
Statistical Compendium unless otherwise indicated.10 I use the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices for all items (HICP) to measure inﬂation as the annual percentage
change from the previous period level value: πt =1 0 0 ( HICPt/HICPt−12 − 1).T h e
inﬂation rate series covers the period 1991:1 to 2002:07. To measure ‘core inﬂation’,
I use HICP that excludes food, alcohol, beverage, tobacco and energy components.
The inﬂation is again measured in annual percentage changes and the data spans the
period 1991:01 to 2002:02.11 As a variable to extract information on monetary policy,
I use the Interbank deposit bid rates until December 1998 and from January 1999 the
euro overnight index average (EONIA) as published by the European Central Bank.
This series covers the period 1994:1 to 2002:07.
As explained, to measure the output gap, I have used monthly data on seasonally
adjusted industrial production; this is an index series that equals 1 in 1995 and covers
the period 1985:01 to 2002:6. As for the gap built on unemployment data, I have used
the standardized and seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in monthly frequency
for the period 1990:7 to 2002:2. As for the output gap series published by the OECD,
given that the OECD’s estimates are annual, I have converted them to monthly
9The choice of the instrument list basically follows Clarida et al. (1998), with some modiﬁcations
to account for the speciﬁc features of the economy in question.
10Luxembourg is included in all the Euro-Area series, but not in the G_OECD output gap series.
This is not problematic given its small size, and for this reason the country is excluded from the
analysis that follows.
11Both HICP are indices which take the value 1 in 1996, and are not seasonally adjusted. Mixing
seasonally adjusted data with unadjusted data has not created any problems. However, it may be
instructive to add seasonal dummies.
12frequency using a linear interpolation method. This series begins in 1985:01 and
ﬁnishes in 2002:7, utilizing OECD projections for the last seven months. To estimate
the potential output I have also used quarterly GDP data (seasonally adjusted, in
constant 1995 prices and expressed in billion euro- that covers the period 1995:1-
2001:4).
Regarding the instruments, for the monetary aggregate I use the total M3 level
measured at the end of each month, which is obtained from the ECB Monthly Bulletin
for the months after 1998:1. The series starts in 1990:1 and ﬁnishes in 2002:7, and is
not seasonally adjusted. As for the exchange rate, I use the real eﬀective exchange
rate (starting in 1990:1 and ending in 2002:7) as made available in the ECB Monthly
Bulletin.12 To measure US ‘core inﬂation’, I use an HICP that excludes food, alcohol,
beverage, tobacco and energy components. The inﬂation rate is again measured in
annual percentage changes and covers the period 1991:01 to 2002:02.
Given the various lengths of the series involved, the past values of the series
used as instruments and the future values of inﬂation needed in the forward-looking
speciﬁcations, in most of the estimations the sample period extends from 1995:1 to
2002:3, although it is shorter when core inﬂation and output gaps built on GDP enter
the estimations.
4R o b u s t n e s s A n a l y s i s
Three forms of uncertainty relevant to monetary policy can be identiﬁed: uncertainty
about the state of the economy, about the structure and the functioning of the econ-
omy and about the strategic interaction between central banks and private agents.
All of these may be increased by the regime shift associated with the formation of the
EMU, which makes the ECB’s job uniquely challenging. In the presence of impor-
tant data and model uncertainty, it is highly desirable to ensure the "robustness" of
a n yr u l et h a tm a yp r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o ne i t h e rt ot h ep o l i c y - m a k e r so rt ot h ep r i v a t e
agents. Thus, in this section I explore the robustness of the Taylor rule described
earlier. This exercise is constructive, since, given that the ECB is a new institution,
it needs to be predictable so as to prevent monetary policy itself from becoming a
source of uncertainty.
I estimate various speciﬁcations for various output gap measures, and then com-
pare the size of the estimated coeﬃcients across a number of dimensions.13 In this way,
I may conclude whether the inﬂation coeﬃcient exceeds unity or not, and whether
the output gap coeﬃcient is positive or negative. This comparison is made in terms
12Calculated as period averages using the CPI, it takes the value 100 in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999. It
refers to trade with the following countries: United States, Japan, UK, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore.
13Gerdesmeier & Roﬃa (2003) check the robustness of the rule to various gap measures by esti-
mating one speciﬁcation for various gap measures. This is their baseline speciﬁcation, which is a
current version of the rule.
13of the target interest rate equation (equation (3)).
In other words, as explained in section 3.3.1, the starting equation of my estima-
tions is equation (9). The parameters of the implied target equation are derived from
the estimated one by dividing all the coeﬃcients by one minus the coeﬃcient of the
lagged interest rate (see equation (7)), i.e.:















t = α + βπt+n + γxt,
where β is what I call the inﬂation coeﬃcient, and γ the output gap coeﬃcient. As
in the discussion following equation (3), α ≡ it −βπ∗
t from which the target inﬂation
is derived, i.e. π∗
t = it−α
β . The interest rate series (1994:1-2002:7) is suﬃciently long
to use the sample average as an approximation of the long-run nominal rate it,i . e .
it =4 .389. Splitting the period in two, into pre-EMU and EMU, the interest rate
averages are iPRE =4 .9 and iEMU =3 .66. Analogously, the inﬂation sample averages
for the same periods are: πt =2 .07, πPRE =2 .09 and πEMU =2 .05. Similarly for the
core inﬂation: πc
t =1 .92, πc
PRE =2 .19 and πc
EMU =1 .49. In what follows, I compare
the estimated target inﬂation π∗
t with the period’s average; the closeness of π∗
t with πt
may be an indication of good ﬁt of the equation to the data. Nevertheless, the sample
period varies across equations, and diﬀers, more or less, from the period averages
reported here. Therefore, the comparison between π∗
t and πt is just indicative.
4.1 Results for diﬀerent speciﬁcations14 15
Firstly, I estimate for various output gap measures the current version,
i.e. it = c1 +c2πt +c3xt +ρit−1 +εt. All gap measures predict that γ>0 with the
exception of G_OECD, for which the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. As for β, G_OECD,
and G_UNEMPL predict that it is around 1.5, whereas G_HP14 gives a coeﬃcient
below unity and G_QUADR, G_HP129 give an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient. The pre-
dicted inﬂation target from all equations is well above the sample average inﬂation.
To check the stability of parameters, I apply the Chow Breakpoint Test for 1999:1 and
1998:6, and ﬁnd that constancy cannot be rejected for G_OECD and G_UNEMPL,
but it is rejected for G_QUADR, G_HP129 and G_HP14. There are no residual
problems, and the adjusted R2 takes a satisfactorily high value.
Secondly, I estimate the forward-looking version, i.e. it = c1 + c2πt+n +
c3xt + ρit−1 + εt. After trying various expectation horizons, and comparing the
14In the appendix, I display the values of the estimated coeﬃcients per speciﬁcation and equation,
as well as descriptive and other statistics.
15The eﬀects of core inﬂation measure and the gap measures produced with quarterly data are
explored only for selected speciﬁcations. The selection criteria are discussed in the following section.
14adjusted R2 across equations, as well as the t-statistic of c2 and of the other co-
eﬃcients, I set n =2 . This implies that the interest rate reacts to inﬂation two
months ahead.
Except for G_QUAD, the coeﬃcient of which is insigniﬁcant, all gap measures
give β>1.A s f o r γ, G_QUADR, G_HP14, G_HP129 and G_UNEMPL predict
that it is positive, whereas G_OECD produces a negative coeﬃcient. There are no
residual problems, and the adjusted R2 is large.
Checking for the stability of parameters with the Chow Breakpoint Test for Jan-
uary 1999, except for G_QUADR and G_HP129, the constancy hypothesis cannot
be rejected. However, for 1998:6, only G_OECD and G_UNEMPL predict stability.
Moreover, note that, in order to capture the interest rate smoothing in the equa-
tion with G_OECD, apart from the ﬁrst lag, the sixth one was included as well.
Regarding the predicted inﬂation target, it is again above the period’s average.
Concerning the output gap measures interpolated from quarterly GDP data, both
predict a positive output gap coeﬃcient, but neither gives a signiﬁcant inﬂation co-
eﬃcient. In addition, for both measures parameter stability is easily rejected.
As for the alternative inﬂation measure, the output gap measures predict that β>
1- with the exception of G_HP14_Q-, and γ>0 - with the exception of G_QUADR,
G_OECD and G_UNEMPL where the estimator is insigniﬁcant. And as previ-
ously, the hypothesis of stable parameters checked in 1999:1 can be rejected- only
for G_HP14_Q it cannot. Regarding the predicted inﬂation target, this time for all
equations it is very close to the period’s average. Not least, it is worth pointing out
that, when the interest rate is regressed on core inﬂation, the forward-looking horizon
becomes larger; it equals six months, with the exception of G_HP14_Q for which
n =1 .
Thirdly, I consider the inclusion of a dummy variable to account for
the start of the EMU. The dummy equals 0 for the pre-EMU period and 1 for
the EMU period.
Version A: it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3xt + ρit−1 + c4dummy + εt
All gap measures predict signiﬁcantly that γ>0- except for G_OECD whose
coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant- and β>1. There are no residual problems, and the value
of adjusted R2 is satisfactorily large. Regarding the predicted inﬂation target, the
majority of the gap measures predicts that the pre-EMU period inﬂation target is
lower than that of the EMU period, although the relevant period averages suggest
the opposite.16
16This is because in every case αEMU <α PRE.( R e m e m b e rt h a tπ∗
t = it−α
β .) Besides, πPRE and
πEMU diﬀer slightly. In particular, for the months prior to January 1999, G_QUADR, G_HP14
and G_hp129 produce values very close to πPRE, while G_UNEMPL and G_OECD values above
it. As for the EMU period: all gap measures predict an inﬂation target value close to the period
average (except for G_UNEMPL whose target value exceeds the average by almost a unit).
15Version B: it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3xt + c4dummy + c5dummy ∗ πt+2 + c6dummy ∗
xt + ρit−1 + εt
For every one of the gap measures dummy and dummy ∗ xt turn out to be
insigniﬁcant.
Version C: it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3dummy ∗ πt+2 + c4xt + ρit−1 + εt
The dummy is signiﬁcant for all gap measures, except for G_OECD. G_QUADR
and G_HP14 predicts that γ>0, β>1 for dates before 1999:1 and β<1 for the
months after. G_UNEMPL, G_OECD, and G_HP129 predict β>1 for the period
before and after January 1999, and (apart from the equation of G_OECD where the
coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant) γ>0. There are no residual problems, and the adjusted
R2 is satisfactorily large. Regarding the predicted inﬂation target, as in the previous
speciﬁcation, it happens that the pre-EMU predicted inﬂation target is lower than
the EMU one.17
Concerning the output gap measures interpolated from quarterly GDP data, they
both predict a positive output gap coeﬃcient and in both equations the dummy is
signiﬁc a n t .H o w e v e r ,a l t h o u g hb o t hg i v ea ni n ﬂation coeﬃcient above unity for the
period before January 1999, for the EMU period G_HP14_Q predicts that β<1
and G_QUADR_Q that β>1.
As for the alternative inﬂation measure, note ﬁrst that with the exception of
G_UNEMPL the dummy is insigniﬁcant. The output gap measures predict that
β>1 and γ>0- with the exception of G_OECD and G_UNEMPL where the
estimator is insigniﬁcant. As for the expectational horizon, n =2only for G_HP14
and G_HP129, whereas for G_OECD n =3and for the rest n =6 .C o n c e r n i n g
the predicted inﬂation, there is a tendency for the various gap measures (the ones
built on quarterly data included) to produce inﬂation targets close to the average.
For G_UNEMPL, where the dummy is signiﬁcant, the EMU inﬂation target is lower
than the pre- EMU.
The results concerning the coeﬃcients’ size are summarized in table 1, where in
addition I report the results of a Wald test on whether the β and γ take simultaneously
the values originally suggested by Taylor (see equation (5)) .
17This is because in every case βEMU <β PRE. (Remeber that π∗
t = it−α
β .) Besides, πPRE
and πEMU diﬀer slightly. In particular, for the preEMU period it happens for various gap measures
(even the ones built on quarterly data) to produce inﬂation targets close or above the period average.
For the EMU period, there is a tendency for the gap measures (even the ones built on quarterly
data) to produce inﬂation targets close or slightly above the period average, with G_UNEMPL and
G_QUADR_Q giving the largest upward deviations.
16Table 1a: Estimated coeﬃcients for various gap measures (all items HICP)
current forward-looking speciﬁcation
speciﬁcation dummy dummy multiplied
(simple) as constant with πt+2
β γ TR β γ TR β γ TR β γ TR
pre-EMU EMU
G_QUADR - >0 X - >0 X >1 >0 × >1 <1 >0 ××
G_HP14 <1 >0 X >1 >0 X >1 >0 X >1 <1 >0 X×
G_HP129 - >0 X >1 >0 X >1 >0 X >1 <1 >0 ××
G_OECD >1 - × >1 <0 × >1 - X >1 - XX
G_UNEMPL >1 >0 X >1 >0 X >1 >0 X >1 >1 >0 XX
G_QUADR_Q - >0 × >1 >1 >0 ××
G_HP14_Q - >0 × >1 <1 >0 ××




β γ TR β γ TR
pre-EMU EMU
G_QUADR - - × >1 >0 ××
G_HP14 >1 >0 × >1 >0 XX
G_HP129 >1 >0 × >1 >0 XX
G_OECD >1 - × >1 - X×
G_UNEMPL >1 - X >1 >1 - XX
G_QUADR_Q >1 >0 X >1 >0 ××
G_HP14_Q - >0 × >1 >0 XX
Note: The current speciﬁcation is it = c1 + c2πt + c3xt + ρit−1 + εt. The simple forward-looking
speciﬁcation is it = c1 +c2πt+2 +c3xt +ρit−1 +εt.The forward-looking speciﬁcation with the dummy as
ac o n s t a n ti sit = c1 +c2πt+2 +c3xt +ρit−1 +c4dummy +εt. The forward-looking with the dummy
times πt+2 is it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3dummy ∗ πt+2 + c4xt + ρit−1 + εt. The dummy equals 0 for
the pre-EMU era and 1 for the EMU period. Regarding notation: β is the inﬂation coeﬃcient, γ the output gap
coeﬃcient and "-" indicates insigniﬁcance at the 5% level. As for the column with the heading "TR" it reports
whether the hypothesis of β =1 .5 and γ =0 .5 can be rejected; "×”indicates rejection and "X”the opposite.
Fourthly, a measure of the money supply has been added to the regres-
sors of the estimated equation. As discussed in section 3.1, it may be that the
interest rate reacts to the growth of the broad money supply (M3). To explore this
possibility, I estimate the following equation: it = c1+c2πt+n+c3xt+c4zt+ρit−1+εt
for n ≥ 0 and zt =1 0 0 ( l n M3t − lnM3t−1) or zt =1 0 0 ( l n M3t − lnM3t−12).A c -
cordingly, in the instrument list, the lags of the deviation of money supply from its
HP trend are replaced by the lags of zt.F o rb o t hzt deﬁnitions, and for all the gap
17measures considered, c4 turns out to be negative. This is contrary to what one would
expect, since higher money supply growth should provoke an interest rate increase in
order to prevent inﬂation from rising. Due to this counterintuitive sign of the money
growth coeﬃcient, and to the fact that its addition does not result in a dramatically
better ﬁt nor does it change the predictions for β and γ, I have decided to continue
without it.18
4.2 Overall results: across output gap measures and speciﬁ-
cations19
The adjusted R2, being an indication in favor of the estimated rule, varies from 94%
to 97%. In addition, there are no serial autocorrelation problems with the residuals.
Regarding the estimators, with a couple of exceptions, they have the expected sign
and magnitude; as a rule, the output gap coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and positive and
the inﬂation coeﬃcient is above unity, albeit only slightly.
G_HP14 and G_HP129 produce signiﬁcant and very similar estimators in mag-
nitude. G_QUADR, in spite of its being a comparable method, does not give a sig-
niﬁcant inﬂation estimator very often. G_UNEMPL, as a rule, produces the largest
estimators; the output gap coeﬃcient exceeds unity, and in many cases, it even ex-
ceeds 2. G_OECD is certainly a particular case: as a rule, the output gap coeﬃcient
is insigniﬁcant and when it becomes signiﬁcant it is negative! Moreover, concerning
the interest rate smoothing it is occasionally necessary to include the sixth lag of the
interest rate in addition to the ﬁrst. On a regular basis, G_OECD produces signif-
icant inﬂation coeﬃcients whose values are among the highest. As for the inﬂation
target, G_UNEMPL and G_OECD predict relatively higher values than the rest.
More interestingly, compared with the current version, the forward-looking pro-
duces larger inﬂation coeﬃcients (that plainly exceed unity) and smaller output gap
coeﬃcient estimators (albeit positive), as well as a lower target inﬂation rate and an
interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient. Moving further, to compare the simple forward-
looking version with the forward-looking version with a dummy as a constant, the
inﬂation coeﬃcient exceeds unity even more. As for the level of the target inﬂa-
tion rate from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, for some gap measures it is closer to the EMU
period target inﬂation rate and for others closer to the pre-EMU one, as these are
predicted from the second speciﬁcation. More importantly note that the majority
of the gap measures predicts a lower inﬂation target for the pre-EMU era than for
the EMU period, contradicting what the period averages suggest. 20 To complete the
18Gerdesmeier & Roﬃa (2003) report that money supply developments enter signiﬁcantly as an
additional variable in the rule, reducing the estimates of both β and γ; this may be due to the way
they construct their money supply indicator.
19In these comparisons the gap measures from quartely GDP data are ignored because of their
inferior ﬁt to the data.
20However, the diﬀerence between the two periods is not very large. Putting aside a couple of
18comparison across speciﬁc a t i o n s ,l e tm ef o c u so nt h ef o r w a r d - l o o k i n gv e r s i o nw i t h
the dummy multiplied with the inﬂation rate. Juxtaposed with the simple forward-
looking version, it produces higher inﬂation rate coeﬃcients when compared with the
pre-EMU estimators and lower when compared with the EMU ones. Juxtaposed with
the forward-looking version with a dummy as a constant, it produces higher pre-EMU
inﬂation rate coeﬃcients and alike EMU ones. In addition, the inﬂation target values
are very similar for both periods across the two speciﬁcations. Note, however that,
as previously, the pre-EMU target inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sl o w e rt h a nt h eE M Ut a r g e tl e v e l -
although the deviations are slight.
As for the output gap coeﬃcient, it turns out that the current speciﬁcation pro-
duces the highest estimators, followed by the simple forward-looking version and the
dummy augmented forward-looking version. Lastly, as far as the interest rate smooth-
ing coeﬃcients are concerned, the current speciﬁcation produces higher estimators
compared to the simple forward-looking version, which produces higher estimators
compared to the forward speciﬁcation with the dummy as a constant, which in turn
produces higher estimators when compared with the forward speciﬁcation with the
dummy multiplied with the inﬂation rate.
Regarding the alternative inﬂation measure, namely core inﬂation, it is instruc-
tive to make some comparisons. Firstly, comparing the results across gap measures,
G_HP14 and G_HP129 produce similar estimators and target inﬂation levels and
G_OECD behaves as described previously. G_UNEMPL still produces the highest
inﬂation coeﬃcient estimator, but the gap coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant in both spec-
iﬁcations where the core inﬂation has been included. Secondly,b e t w e e nt h et w o
speciﬁcations that have been estimated with core inﬂation as a regressor, i.e. the
simple forward-looking and the forward-looking with the dummy multiplied with the
inﬂation rate, the simple one produces higher inﬂation coeﬃcients (and higher in-
terest rate smoothing coeﬃcients), but lower (and more frequently insigniﬁcant) gap
coeﬃcients and target inﬂation levels. Thirdly, juxtaposed with the simple forward-
looking speciﬁcation of the broad HICP inﬂation rate, the simple version of the core
inﬂation produces higher inﬂation rate coeﬃcients, but lower (and more frequently
insigniﬁcant) gap coeﬃcients, target inﬂation levels and interest rate smoothing coeﬃ-
cients. Juxtaposed with the forward-looking speciﬁcation of the broad HICP inﬂation
rate with the dummy multiplied with the inﬂation rate, in the analogous version of
t h ec o r ei n ﬂation the dummy is insigniﬁcant in almost all equations. In addition,
it seems that the equations with core inﬂa t i o np r o d u c el o w e rg a pc o e ﬃcients (and
interest rate smoothing coeﬃcients), inﬂation rate coeﬃcients that lie between the
pre-EMU and EMU broad HICP ones, and inﬂation target values that are relatively
closer to the pre-EMU value as predicted by the broad HICP. However, there are too
many exceptions to have a clear-cut idea.21
exceptional values (namely the ones from G_OECD and G_UNEMPL), the two targets diﬀer by
less than half unit.
21Gerdesmeier & Roﬃa (2003) have found that using a HICP index that excludes food and energy
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5.1 Speciﬁcation Selection
To begin with, a choice between the current and the forward-looking speciﬁcations
has to be made. To do so, the following equation is estimated:
it = c1 + c2aπt+2 + c2bπt + c3xt + ρit−1 + εt.
It turns out that for G_OECD and G_UNEMPL the coeﬃcient of expected inﬂation
is signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient of current inﬂation is insigniﬁcant. For the rest
of the gap measures, both coeﬃcients are simultaneously insigniﬁcant. Even with
diﬀerent expectational horizons, i.e. n =3or 6, the results remain the same. In
addition, the adjusted R2 for each equation is compared; in all cases, current or
forward-looking, it is close to 96%. Therefore, based on the previous arguments, it
seems more appropriate to adopt a forward-looking speciﬁcation.
Next, I compare the various forward-looking speciﬁcations. In the speciﬁcation,
it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3xt + c4dummy + c5dummy ∗ πt+2 + c6dummy ∗ xt + ρit−1 + εt,
the regressors dummy and dummy ∗ xt are insigniﬁcant for all the gap measures.
Therefore, the speciﬁcation,
it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3dummy ∗ πt+2 + c4xt + ρit−1 + εt, (10)
is preferred to it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3xt + ρit−1 + c4dummy + εt.
To ﬁnish the speciﬁcation selection, a choice ought to be made between equation
(10) and it = c1+c2πt+2+c3xt+ρit−1+εt. Comparing the adjusted R2 of both speci-
ﬁcations for each equation, I ﬁnd that for every gap measure (with the sole exception
of G_QUADR_Q), the dummy-augmented speciﬁcation produces higher adjusted
R2 and better residuals (even in terms of autocorrelation). Besides, a dummy aug-
mented speciﬁcation incorporates the rejection of the parameters’ stability hypothesis
observed for the vast majority of the speciﬁcations. Thus, equation (10) is maintained
for the rest of the analysis.
As for selecting among the various gap measures, the adjusted R2 among equations
are compared to ﬁnd that G_HP14 produces the higher value (with the G_HP129
producing the second value in order). This is a satisfying outcome given the results
presented in the previous section, according to which G_HP14 has not produced any
estimators out of the ordinary.
To conclude, equation (10) with xt standing for G_HP14 prevails.
delivers a higher β and a lower γ estimate. In general, concerning the sensitivity of the results to
the various output gap measures, they argue that the estimates do not seem fully robust. However,
their conclusion is based on a single speciﬁcation, which, according to the speciﬁcation selection
procedure adopted in the present paper, is not superior to the others.
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The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic values. In table 2, summary statis-
tics are presented.
Table 2: Summary statistics for equation (11)
R-squared 0.96 test stat prob
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 Breusch-Godfrey LM (H0= no autocorrelation)
S.E. of regression 0.19 2l a g s 1.45 0.48
Sum squared resid 2.97 6l a g s 6.9 0.32
Mean dependent var 4.2 12 lags 16.6 0.16
S.D. dependent var 1.01 ARCH Test (H0=n oA R C H )
F-statistic 590 6 (2) lags 7.6(4.3) 0.2(0.1)
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 Jarque-Bera (H0=n o r m a l i t y ) 1.04 0.59
White Test (H0= no heteroskedasticity) 13.1 0.43
As explained in the discussion opening the fourth section, the parameters of the
implied target rule are derived from the estimated equation by dividing all the coef-
ﬁcients by one minus the coeﬃcient of the lagged interest rate. It follows that the















t =1 .935 + 1.35πt+2 +0 .389xt ⇒
α =1 .9,β















t =1 .935 + 0.81604πt+2 +0 .389xt ⇒ (14)
α =1 .9,β
EMU =0 .82,γ=0 .4, (15)
where α ≡ it − βπ∗
t and π∗
t = it−α
β . The corresponding sample period’s mean is
used as an approximation of it, and given the parameters’ values in (12) and (15),
it follows that π
∗preEMU
t = 4.604791667−1.935
1.35 =1 .9776 and π∗EMU
t = 3.711794872−1.935
0.81604 =
2.1773. The estimated inﬂation target for the pre-EMU period is identical to the
average inﬂation rate for the period January 1995 to December 1998, which equals
1.91. As for the EMU period estimated inﬂation target, it diﬀers slightly from the
21average inﬂation (of the corresponding period January 1999 to March 2002), which
equals 2.05. This is an indication that the estimated rule ﬁts the data.
Next, for the sake of robustness, it is worth cross-checking the estimation outcome
of equation (11) by estimating speciﬁcation (10) with a diﬀerent method, namely the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM from now on).22 A ss h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 6 )
the estimates are rather similar- the numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic values,












i.e. α =2 .05,β
preEMU =1 .32,γ=0 .44 (17)
and α =2 .05,β
EMU =0 .74,γ=0 .44. (18)













The J-statistic tests for the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, and
the Q-statistic is the Ljung-Box statistic at a speciﬁed lag order, which tests for the
null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to this lag order.
Let us focus on the EMU period from now on. Equation (13) can be written like
equation (2), inserting the estimated π∗EMU
t ,i . e .i∗
t =3 .711+0.82(πt+2−2.17)+0.4xt,
implying that when both inﬂation and output are on target, the optimal EMU rate
would equal 3.711,o r1.541 in real terms.
Comparing the estimated equation with the original Taylor rule, certain remarks
should be made. To begin with, the lagged interest rate has been included in the
speciﬁcation. The constant goes above unity- to account for the higher ‘equilibrium’
interest rate-, while the size of the inﬂation response coeﬃcient is considerably lower,
falling below the unity threshold. However, taking into account the standard error
of the point estimate reported in equation (12), it may be that β
EMU > 1.A l lt h e
coeﬃcients enter with the right sign and have reasonable size. The hypothesis that
β =1 .5 and γ =0 .5 cannot be rejected for the pre-EMU period, but it can be rejected
for the EMU period.
22Here the orthogonality conditions underlying GMM are identical to the assumptions of the TSLS.
The optimal weighting matrix is obtained by using the TSLS parameter estimates. The weighting
matrix is chosen so that the GMM estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
of unknown form. The bandwidth selection criterion is set to be the ﬁxed Newey and West and the
autocovariances in computing the weighting matrix are weighted according to a Bartlett kernel.
22Table 4: Wald Test for equation (11)
Wald Test
H0: β =1 .5 and γ =0 .5, or
H0: c2 + c3 =0.394995, c4 =0.131665
before 1999:1 after 1999:1
Chi-square 2.31 Chi-square 14
Probability 0.31 Probability 0.001
Concerning the smoothing parameter ρ, it is large enough to conﬁrm the conven-
tional wisdom that the central bank is concerned about smoothing adjustments in
the interest rate; it also suggests considerable interest rate inertia. A speciﬁcation
that assumes an immediate adjustment of the actual rate to its target level would,
thus, be too restrictive.
With respect to the constant, uncertainty about the long-run interest rate does
not cause unstable inﬂation; rather it results in a mistake in the level of the long-
run inﬂation rate. The size of the inﬂation mistake depends on the inﬂation response
coeﬃc i e n t .I fi t sv a l u ei sc l o s et ou n i t y ,m i s t a k e sa b o u tt h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t ew i l lc a u s e
bigger mistakes in the inﬂation rate, this being another reason to keep the parameter
well above unity. The estimated coeﬃcient does not plainly exceed unity so as to
ensure that when inﬂation rises, real rates also go up to bring inﬂation down; its size
is much lower than could have been expected given the bank’s ‘primary objective’.
To conclude the section, note that for the same speciﬁcation in equation (13),
G_QUADR predicts β
EMU =0 .96, γ =0 .3,G _ H P 1 2 9β
EMU =1 .005, γ =0 .34,
while G_UNEMPL predicts β
EMU =1 .26, γ =1 .3 and G_OECD β
preEMU =
β
EMU =1 .75 with γ insigniﬁcant. In such a short sample period distortions may
arise; if, for instance, during the sample period the central bank is disinﬂating by
pushing up real rates, it is likely that the constant term is overestimated, instead of
estimating a higher inﬂation coeﬃcient. This makes sense since the constant incor-
porates a relatively high long-run interest rate. Or, more interestingly, suppose that
the bank responds aggressively to large deviations of inﬂation from target but not
to small deviations. Then by estimating over a period where inﬂation does not vary
much from its target, one might mistakenly conclude that the bank is not aggressive
in ﬁghting inﬂation, that is, one might mistakenly obtain too low an estimate of the
inﬂation response coeﬃcient. The period 1999:1 to 2002:3 appears to contain some
v a r i a t i o ni ni n ﬂation relative to the sample mean (the standard deviation is 0.69),
and major distortions do not seem to come up. In any case, lengthening the sample
when new data becomes available is highly desirable.
Similar exercises in the literature: the reported estimated coeﬃcients
Clausen & Hayo (2002), with aggregate weighted data from Germany, France and
Italy for the period 1979:1-1996:4, ﬁnd that β =2 .15,γ=2 .12 and α =3 .91 (with
ρ =0 .86). Mihov (2001), with data from Germany, France and Italy for the period
231990:3-1998:4, ﬁnds that β =1 .83 and γ =1 .09 (with ρ =0 .63). Gerlach & Schnabel
(2000), with aggregate weighted EMU-11 data for the period 1990:1-1998:4, ﬁnd that
β =2 .22,γ=0 .76 and α =3 .89 (with ρ =0 .32). In a forward-looking speciﬁcation,
they ﬁnd that c2 =1 .51,c 3 =0 .34 and c1 =1 .95 ( with insigniﬁcant ρ).
These surveys diﬀer from the present paper most importantly because none of
them estimates the interest rate rule with data from the actual EMU period. Gerdesmeier
&R o ﬃa (2003) report parameter values of the speciﬁcation with current inﬂation
and output gap estimated for EMU for various periods: for instance, for 1990- 2002
β =1 .93,γ=0 .28, α =1 .8 and ρ =0 .87 while for 1999-2002, β =0 .45,γ=0 .30,
α =2 .6 and ρ =0 .72. Regarding the pre-EMU period, note the close similarity of the
r e s u l t sr e p o r t e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 2 )w i t ht h o s er e p o r t e db yG e r l a c h&S c h n a b e l( 2 0 0 0 )
for the forward-looking speciﬁcation.
Relation with the actual policy performance To close the section, it is in-
structive to focus on the actual ECB policy and compare the EMU rule estimated
target rate with the actual realization of the short-term interest rate. In ﬁgure 2 both
rates are displayed. And, although I compare the actual rate with the implied target
rate, as opposed to the ﬁtted model that allows for partial adjustment, the target rate
captures the direction of movement consistently, and on 10 points the rates virtually
coincide.
Compared with the estimated rule, from July 1999 to April 2001 the central
bank has pursued a looser policy than justiﬁed by the economic conditions. This
policy stance has favored countries in danger of recession, like France and Germany,
but has aggravated the stress in ‘smaller’ economies with high inﬂation and positive
output gap. However, during the ﬁr s ts i xm o n t h s ,a n dt h el a s tt w e l v et h ep o l i c yw a s
relatively tighter; credibility building in 1999 and reversion of the output gap in 2002
may explain these deviations.23
23These ﬁndings are in accordance with Mihov’s (2001) conclusions; he has observed that in mid-
1999 the monetary policy was looser than called for by macroeconomic conditions. Similarly, Clausen
& Hayo (2002) have observed that actual interest rates were lower than the values suggested by their
estimated ECB reaction function for the period January 1999 to July 2000.
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6 On the convergence of macroeconomics condi-
tions in the EMU
Even though a Taylor-type interest rate rule is not said to be the optimal rule driving
the conduct of monetary policy, it ﬁts the data very well, oﬀering a useful guideline
to private agents watching the ECB decisions. In addition, it may be considered as a
summary measure of the convergence in macroeconomic conditions, since it weights
inﬂation and output deviations from their target values (Artis (2002)). In this spirit,
in the present section I compare the ideal policy stance for the Euro-Area as a whole
with the optimal policy for the individual member countries, considering this to be
an alternative way to identify the diverging economies in the EMU. My benchmark
indicator is the interest rate rule estimated previously.
How ‘ideal’ is the EMU target rate for the member countries? Figure 3
depicts the disparities in the estimated target interest rates across countries in the ﬁrst
year of the EMU.2425 F o rt h em a j o r i t yo ft h em e m b e rc o u n t r i e st h er u l ei n d i c a t e dr a t e
is above the EMU one. The divergences on the left of the EMU target are relatively
small in size, as they never exceed 50 basis points. However, on the right of the EMU
target, divergences are far more conspicuous. Note the outliers, and in particular
Ireland for which the diﬀerence is 160 basis points.
24The values presented are annual averages.
25Greece entered the EMU in 2001.
25F o rG e r m a n y ,A u s t r i a ,B e l g i u m ,F r a n c e ,F i n l a n da n dI t a l yt h ec o m m o np o l i c yr u l e
target is fairly consistent with the local conditions (a deviation ≤ 50 basis points).
However, for the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and certainly Ireland, it is much lower
than local conditions require for overheating to be avoided.
Figure 3: Target rate disparity in 1999
1999
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Figure 4 illustrates the diﬀerences in optimal target rates in the second year of
the EMU. With the exceptions of France, Greece, Germany, Portugal and Austria,
for the remaining country members the rule indicated rate is higher than the EMU
target rate. On both sides, in most cases, divergences stay bounded below 100 basis
points of diﬀerence. Ireland is the outstanding exception, as the rule indicated rate
exceeds the EMU target by 210 basis points, and then Finland with a deviation of 130
basis points. As for Spain, the deviation from the EMU target is once more almost
100 basis points . In more detail, the EMU target interest rule entails too high a rate
for France, and a too low one for Belgium, Spain, Finland and Ireland. For Greece,
Germany, Portugal, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands the EMU target is more or
less in accordance with local developments, implying that the common policy stance
is not likely to provoke imbalances.
26Figure 4: Target rate disparity in 2000
2000
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Figure 5 depicts the divergences in the rule indicated interest rates for 2001. For
most countries, the deviation is smaller than ± 100 basis points. Exceptions do exist,
however. The deviations for France, Ireland and Greece are almost equal to 100 basis
points. For the Netherlands the domestic target exceeds the EMU target by 170
basis points and for Portugal by 120 basis points. France and Austria run the risk of
enduring a downturn, while Ireland, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands run the
risk of overheating. For Italy, Germany, Belgium and Spain, the EMU target rate is
roughly in line with local economic conditions.
Figure 5: Target rate disparity in 2001
2001









IR L E L P T N L
A comparison of the dispersion of target rates around the EMU target suggests
that deviations were larger in 2000; this being in accordance with the ﬁndings of
Artis(2002). To complete the story, it shall be emphasized that the HP ﬁlter used to
27measure the output gap suﬀers from the so-called end-of-sample problem. Focusing,
for example, on the Irish case, it is worth noting that one year before the end of
the series (in June 2002) the output gap turns negative after years of large positive
values. Given the ﬁlter’s smoothing parameter, and the lack of information on future
developments, one cannot be sure whether the observed values indicate a cyclical
deviation or a reversal of the trend. A ﬁrst attempt to incorporate projections of
industrial production has not been fruitful. Therefore, the results presented for the
last year may be considerably biased.26
Thus, in brief, according to the rule indicated optimal rates, throughout the ﬁrst
three EMU years, for Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, and, to a much
lesser extent, for France, the predictions of the ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ rule are not consistent
with the needs of the domestic economies.27 These deviations are likely to be ignored
by the ECB due to the small weight in the area’s averages of the countries involved
(Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998b), Cecchetti, Mark &Sonora (2000))-France
excluded. The crucial thing is that the larger the deviation, the greater the implied
pressure on the adjustment mechanisms of the economy to avoid either overheating
or depression.
The adjustment mechanisms of the member countries In a case where the
common monetary policy does not control inﬂation or stabilize the economy, there is a
much greater burden on alternative mechanisms to achieve these objectives. Speaking
of mechanisms compensating or supplementing the lack of an independent monetary
policy, Sapir & Buti (2001) oﬀer some indicative results. They have estimated the
capacity of countries to withstand shocks, and have found that Ireland, Austria,
the Netherlands and Finland attain high labor and product market ﬂexibility. On
the other hand, Greece, Italy, France and Portugal seem to have the most rigid
markets among EMU member countries.28 They have also observed that France and
Germany are very highly similar to the Euro-Area export structure; Belgium, Austria,
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands are highly similar; whereas Ireland, Greece, Finland,
Luxembourg and Portugal are relatively highly dissimilar to the Euro-Area export
exposure. Thus, combining the relative position of individual countries in terms
of budgetary policy maneuverability and structural adjustment capability, Ireland
and Finland seem fairly well equipped to hold up asymmetric disturbances, which
are expected to be frequent given their idiosyncratic economic structures. On the
26Nevertheless, according to McMorrow& Roeger(2001), the end-point eﬀects are mainly notice-
able for the last 3 or 4 observations. This means that the end-of-sample problem is not relevant in
m yc a s e ,s i n c et h es a m p l ep e r i o dﬁnishes in March 2002.
27Similarly, Bjorksten & Syrjanen (1999), using the Taylor rule (equation (5) with the constant
adjusted), compare the EMU ideal policy stance with the optimal rate for the individual member
countries, and ﬁnd that Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain diverge from the EMU target, being at
greatest risk for overheating. On the other side, divergences do not exceed 100 basis points, with
Germany at the ‘coolest’ position.
28This grouping is not uncontroversial, but the issue is beyond my interests.
28contrary, Italy, Greece and Portugal seem poorly prepared, even though they are
exposed to country-speciﬁc disturbances. The rest (that is the former DM-zone plus
Spain) appear to have middling capability to withstand shocks; but most of them are
not prone to experience asymmetric shocks.
7 Concluding remarks
A rule that feeds back from divergence between objectives and long-run sustainable
values encapsulates features of the practice of a stability-oriented central bank. And,
although it would be misleading to interpret any statistical tests on such a rule
as inferences about the actual motives behind the conduct of policy, its success in
tracking past policy moves by the central bank is instructive and valuable for the
credibility and the good functioning of the monetary policy.
The present paper focuses on such an interest rate rule for the EMU area. It
contributes to the literature an analysis of the robustness of the rule to the output
gap, an unobservable variable subject to uncertainty, based on estimations which
involve all EMU members and making use of the oﬃcially published Euro-Area data.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that the size of the rule parameters is robust to
various output gap measures and to two alternative inﬂation measures. In particular,
the inﬂation coeﬃcient is estimated to be above the unity threshold in most of the
cases, while the output gap coeﬃcient is estimated to be positive. Furthermore, it has
been shown that the target interest rate rule (of the most preferred speciﬁcation) ﬁts
the data very well and tracks the ECB’s past decisions surprisingly closely. Lastly, the
estimated target rule has been applied as a measure of convergence in macroeconomic
conditions across member countries, and it has been proved that the EMU target rate
is not consistent with the needs of quite a few member economies.
The paper can be extended along a number of dimensions. In the ﬁrst place,
projections of the industrial production series need to be incorporated so as to cope
with the end-of-sample problem. Moreover, it would be instructive to add an output
gap measure constructed with a structural method. Last but not least, taking into
account the (re-)emergence of sizeable cross-country diﬀerences in inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
last two years, it would be interesting to explore further the causes of this regional
inﬂation divergence and its implications for the common monetary policy.
29APPENDIX
Note for all the tables presented in this appendix: Concerning the ﬁrst panel, the
numbers in parentheses are t-statistic values, "∗" denotes insigniﬁcance at the 95% level.
The dummy equals 0 for the pre-EMU period and 1 for the EMU period. Concerning the
second panel, in the cells with double entries separated by "/", the ﬁrst entry refers to
the pre-EMU period and the second to the EMU period. The LM Test presented is the
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for serial autocorrelation computed for 6 lags. The numbers in
parentheses are probability values for "H0: no autocorrelation".
Table A1 (Current looking speciﬁcation-Broad HICP)
it = c1 + c2πt + c3xt + ρit−1 + εt












































t = a + βπt+2 + γxt
a 2.23
β 1.617 1.30 0.85 1.43
γ 0.604 2.55 0.686 0.68
π∗ 2.658 3.298 2.404 3.0
R2 0.954 0.955 0.959 0.961 0.955
Adj.R2 0.953 0.954 0.957 0.959 0.953
LM Test 8.8(0.18) 7.7(0.2) 5.2(0.5) 5.3(0.4) 5.8(0.4)
30Table A2 (forward-looking speciﬁcation-Broad HICP)
it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3xt + ρit−1 + εt
































































t = a + βπt+2 + γxt
a 1.92
β 1.876 1.483 1.01 1.616
γ 0.36 2.195 0.653 0.55 -0.84 3.2 0.65
π∗ 2.238 2.83 2.249 2.59
R2 0.959 0.956 0.959 0.959 0.957 0.95 0.932
Adj.R2 0.957 0.954 0.958 0.959 0.957 0.947 0.928
LM Test 9.3(0.1) 9.7(0.1) 6.3(0.3) 4.2(0.6) 6.4(0.3) 6.9(0.3) 8.6(0.1)
Table A3 (forward-looking speciﬁcation-Broad HICP)
it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3xt + ρit−1 + c4dummy + εt




















































t = a + βπt+2 + γxt
a 1.86/0.07 0/-1.23 1.84/0.62 2.32/1.36
β 1.567 1.59 1.38 1.1 1.606
γ 0.24 1.24 0.34 0.41
π∗ 1.93/2.31 3.06/3.08 2.2/2.22 2.33/2.12 3.05/2.3
R2 0.96 0.959 0.963 0.964 0.961
Adj.R2 0.958 0.957 0.961 0.962 0.959
LM Test 5.08(0.5) 7.6(0.2) 4.7(0.5) 5.3(0.4) 7.02(0.3)
31Table A4 (forward-looking speciﬁcation-Broad HICP)
it = c1 + c2πt+2 + c3dummy ∗ πt+2 + c4xt + ρit−1 + εt












































































t = a + βπt+2 + γxt
α 1.22 1.39 1.93 1.64
β 2.01/0.9 1.75/1.2 1.6/1.005 1.35/0.81 1.75 1.77/1.04 1.82/0.8
γ 0.306 1.34 0.34 0.38 0 1.65 1.91
π∗ 1.81/2.5 2.79/2.9 2.1/2.28 2.19/2.16 2.45 2.76/3.55 1.78/2.3
R2 0.965 0.962 0.966 0.966 0.961 0.939 0.949
ADJ.R2 0.963 0.96 0.964 0.964 0.959 0.934 0.945
LM Test 5.5(0.4) 8.2(0.2) 5.7(0.4) 6.9(0.3) 9.3(0.1) 3.6(0.7) 8.5(0.2)
32Table A5 (forward-looking speciﬁcation-Core inﬂation)
it= c1+c2πt+2+c3xt+ρit−1+εt
































































t= a + βπt+2+γxt
a 1.79 1.05 1.45 1.44
β 1.79 2.32 1.78 1.56 1.55 1.68
γ 0.17 0.22 0.85 16.3
π∗ 2.39 1.07 1.81 1.81 1.83 2.5
R2 0.964 0.965 0.964 0.965 0.96 0.928 0.939
Adj.R2 0.963 0.964 0.962 0.963 0.957 0.925 0.934
LM Test 5.2(0.5) 4.7(0.5) 6.3(0.4) 5.3(0.5) 12(0.05) 6.9(0.3) 11(0.09)
33Table A6 (forward-looking speciﬁcation-Core inﬂation)
it= c1+c2πt+2+c3dummy ∗ πt+2+c4xt+ρit−1+εt












































































t= a + βπt+2+γxt
α 1.15 1.39 1.49 2.25 1.54
β 1.89 1.7/1.48 1.47 1.06 1.57 1.95 1.66
γ 0.128 0.55 0.55 0.91 1.164
π∗ 1.658 2/1.54 1.901 1.92 2.73 2.203 1.659
R2 0.964 0.965 0.958 0.958 0.96 0.931 0.938
Adj.R2 0.962 0.963 0.955 0.956 0.957 0.926 0.933
LM Test 7.3(0.3) 7.2(0.2) 11(0.09) 12(0.06) 6.9(0.3) 5.1(0.5) 7.2(0.3)
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